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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The vast majority of philosophers and legal theorists who have 
thought about the issue agree that there is such a thing as a moral right to 
privacy.  However, there is little or no theoretical consensus about the 
nature of this right.  According to reductionists, the right to privacy 
amounts to nothing more than a cluster of property rights and rights over 
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the person, and therefore plays no autonomous explanatory role in moral 
theory.1  Among nonreductionists, there are numerous accounts of the right 
to privacy.  For one group of nonreductionists (perhaps the majority) the 
right to privacy is properly understood as a right of control, a form of 
autonomy.  Within this group, some think that the right to privacy is the 
right to control information about oneself,2 while others insist that it is 
the right to control access to oneself.3  For another group of nonreductionists, 
the right to privacy is the right to cognitive inaccessibility, physical 
inaccessibility, or both.4  Though these are by far the most widely adopted 
nonreductionist accounts of the relevant right, they are by no means the 
only ones currently on offer.  There are hybrid accounts proposing that 
the right to privacy is a cluster of various rights of control,5 or a cluster 
of various rights of control and restricted access.6  Further, according to an 
influential “information-based” account, the right to privacy is defined as 
the right that others not possess undocumented personal information 
about the rightholder.7 
The purpose of this paper is to bring order to this theoretical chaos.  In 
my view, none of these accounts of the right to privacy is accurate.  As I 
will argue, we are better served by a completely different theoretical 
description of the relevant right.  It is my hope that greater philosophical 
clarity in this area of ethics will lead to a more careful appreciation of 
the value of the right to privacy, as well as legislation and judicial 
reasoning that is more carefully crafted to protect against violations of 
the right. 
 1. Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Right to Privacy, in RIGHTS, RESTITUTION, AND 
RISK 117, 125–26 (William Parent ed., 1986); Frederick Davis, What Do We Mean by 
“Right to Privacy”?, 4 S.D. L. REV. 1, 18 (1959). 
 2. See CHARLES FRIED, AN ANATOMY OF VALUES 140–41 (1970); ALAN F. WESTIN, 
PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967); Elizabeth L. Beardsley, Privacy: Autonomy and 
Selective Disclosure, in NOMOS XIII: PRIVACY 56, 56 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. 
Chapman eds., 1971); Robert S. Gerstein, Intimacy and Privacy, 89 ETHICS 76, 76 
(1978); Adam D. Moore, Privacy: Its Meaning and Value, 40 AM. PHIL. Q. 215, 215–16 
(2003). 
 3. See Ernest Van Den Haag, On Privacy, in NOMOS XIII: PRIVACY, supra note 2, 
at 149, 149; Richard B. Parker, A Definition of Privacy, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 275, 280–
81 (1974); James Rachels, Why Privacy is Important, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 323, 323 
(1975); Jeffrey H. Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 26, 
28, 32 (1976); Thomas Scanlon, Thomson on Privacy, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 315, 315 
(1975). 
 4. See ANITA L. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS 16–17 (1988); Roland Garrett, The 
Nature of Privacy, 18 PHIL. TODAY 263, 264 (1974); Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the 
Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 422–23 (1980). 
 5. JULIE C. INNESS, PRIVACY, INTIMACY, AND ISOLATION 41 (1992). 
 6. JUDITH WAGNER DECEW, IN PURSUIT OF PRIVACY 53, 66 (1997). 
 7. W.A. Parent, Privacy, Morality, and the Law, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 269, 269 
(1983) [hereinafter Parent, Privacy]; W.A. Parent, Recent Work on the Concept of 
Privacy, 20 AM. PHIL. Q. 341, 346 (1983) [hereinafter Parent, Recent Work]. 
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The paper is organized as follows.  In Part II, I place the controversy 
over the nature of the right to privacy within the context of the 
Hohfeldian theory of rights developed by Thomson.  In Part III, I describe 
some well-known paradigm cases in which the right to privacy is 
infringed, and explain how standard theories accommodate these examples.  
In Part IV, I consider counterexamples to the standard theories.  In Part 
V, I return to Thomson’s seminal article, The Right to Privacy, for clues 
to the nature of the right to privacy.  As I will argue, the examples 
Thomson uses in defense of reductionism (ironically) provide the 
inspiration for a novel nonreductionist account that is theoretically 
superior to the standard views.  I call this account the “Barrier Theory.”  
I then conclude with a summary of the main points of the paper and a 
brief discussion of the possible ways in which the Barrier Theory might 
contribute to answering some pressing legal questions. 
II.  RIGHTS 
According to Thomson, whose theory of rights is heavily indebted to 
Hohfeld, rights are either simple or complex.  Complex rights, which 
Thomson calls “cluster-rights,” are combinations of simple rights.  
Simple rights, which are not themselves combinations of other rights, 
come in four varieties: claims, privileges, powers, and immunities.  For 
X to have a claim against Y that P is for Y to be under a duty toward X, 
namely the duty that Y discharges if and only if P.  For example, I have a 
claim against you that you not smash my computer inasmuch as you 
have a duty toward me of not smashing my computer.8  For X to have a 
privilege as regards Y of letting it be the case that P is for X not to be 
under the duty towards Y that X discharges if and only if not-P.  For 
example, I have a privilege as regards you of parking behind your car 
inasmuch as I do not have a duty toward you of not parking behind your 
car.9  For X to have a power as regards Y is for X to have “an ability to 
cause, by an act of [X’s] own, an alteration in [Y’s] rights . . . .”10  For 
example, “by virtue of owning [a certain] typewriter, A is able to make it 
the case, by an act of his own, that A himself loses a claim against B that 
B not use it: A does this if he gives B permission to use it.”11  Finally, 
 8. JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS 41 (1990). 
 9. Id. at 44–45. 
 10. Id. at 57. 
 11. Id. 




“for X to have an immunity against Y just is for Y to lack a power as 
regards X.”12  For example, “[y]ou . . . have an immunity against me if I 
lack the ability to make you cease to own your typewriter.”13 
Among the more important cluster-rights are what Thomson calls 
“liberties.”14  For X to be at liberty to do A (or to have the liberty to do 
A) is (i) for X to have a privilege as regards everyone of doing A, and (ii) 
for X to have a claim against all others that they not interfere in certain 
sorts of ways with X doing A.  Thus, I am at liberty to (or have the 
liberty to) read Middlemarch in my living room inasmuch as (i) I am not 
under a duty toward anyone of not reading Middlemarch in my living 
room and (ii) everyone else is under a duty toward me of not interfering 
(say, by removing my glasses) with my reading Middlemarch in my 
living room. 
Claims are the most important of the simple rights.15  Importantly, 
Thomson distinguishes between claim-infringements and claim-violations.  
For Y to infringe X’s claim against Y that P is for Y to make it the case 
that not-P.  For example, you infringe my claim against you that you not 
smash my computer if you do indeed smash my computer.  To violate a 
claim is to infringe it impermissibly.16  So all claim-violations are ipso 
facto claim-infringements.  It is a substantive thesis in moral theory, one 
that Thomson (in my view, rightly) defends, that not all claim-infringements 
are also claim-violations; it is possible to infringe a claim without violating 
it.  Suppose, for example, that a master terrorist has hidden the only key 
that could disable a nuclear device that is about to go off in Manhattan in 
my computer.  By smashing my computer (which is the only way to get 
at the key in time to prevent the nuclear explosion), you definitely 
infringe the claim I have against you that you not smash my computer.  
But your infringement of this claim of mine is morally permissible or 
justifiable, perhaps even morally required. 
Thomson also says (again, in my view, rightly) that claims vary in 
strictness or stringency.  In general, the more stringent the claim, the greater 
the required increment of good needed to justify infringing it.  For 
example, my right against you that you not kill me is more stringent than 
my right against you that you not smash my computer; the good of 
saving an innocent person’s life is great enough to justify infringing the 
 12. Id. at 59. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 53–54. 
 15. Hohfeld calls them “right[s] in the strictest sense.”  WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, 
FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 36 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., Yale University Press 
1923). 
 16. THOMSON, supra note 8, at 122. 
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latter, but not great enough to justify infringing the former.17  Thomson 
goes further in endorsing what she calls the “Aggravation Principle”: 
If X has a claim against Y that Y do alpha, then the worse Y makes 
things for X if Y fails to do alpha, the more stringent X’s claim 
against Y that Y do alpha . . . .18 
Thus, it is not merely that the stringency of a claim varies with the 
amount of good needed to justify infringing it; a claim’s stringency also 
varies “with how bad its infringement would be for the claim holder.”19  
Thus, it is in large part because infringing my claim to not be killed 
would make things worse for me than would infringing my claim to not 
have my computer smashed, that the former claim is more stringent than 
the latter. 
Finally, it is an important part of the Hohfeld-Thomson theory of 
rights that there are different ways in which a person can cease to have a 
right.20  One way to divest oneself of a right is by waiving it.  For 
example, I might waive my claim against you that you not eat my salad 
by explicitly granting you permission to eat it, or I might waive my 
claim against Officer Smith that she not search my house by explicitly 
consenting to the search.  Another way to lose a right is by forfeiting it.  
For example, a villainous aggressor who attempts to kill you forfeits her 
claim against you that you not kill her (as the only means of preventing 
her from killing you). 
It is in the overall context of the Hohfeld-Thomson theory of rights 
that I wish to discuss the nature of the right to privacy.  Is the right to 
privacy a claim, privilege, power, or immunity?  If it is a claim, what 
conditions are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for its 
infringement?  If it is not a claim, is it a cluster-right, such as a liberty, 
that results from the combination of simple rights?  If it is a cluster-right, 
what exactly are its components? 
III.  CASES 
In order to make progress in answering these questions, it helps, I 
think, to consider paradigm cases in which the right to privacy is (at 
 17. Id. at 153. 
 18. Id. at 154. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 361. 




least) infringed (or violated) and paradigm cases in which it is not.  And, 
in respect of cases, there is no better source than Thomson’s The Right to 
Privacy. 
To begin, consider the following pair of cases adapted from Thomson: 
The Loud Fight 
A married couple, X and Y, are having a fight in their house, 
shouting at each other as loud as they can; unfortunately, they have 
not thought to close the windows, so that they can easily be heard 
from the street outside.  As it happens, Smith, while watering his 
flowers across the street, hears what X and Y say. 
The Quiet Fight 
The same married couple, X and Y, are having a quiet fight, behind 
closed windows, and cannot be heard by the normal person who 
passes by; however, Jones across the street trains an amplifier on 
their house, by means of which he can hear what they say; and he 
does this in order to hear what they say.21 
As Thomson sees it, Jones, but not Smith, infringes the right to privacy 
possessed by the married couple. 
And consider also the famous cases of the pornographic picture and 
the subway map: 
The Pornographic Picture 
Hugh owns a pornographic picture that he does not want anyone 
else to see.  He locks it in his wall-safe and only takes it out at night 
or after pulling down his shades.  Black hears about the picture and 
wants to see it.  Black trains his X-ray device on Hugh’s wall-safe 
and looks at the picture.22 
The Subway Map 
There is a subway map on the wall at the Harvard Square T-stop.  
Larry doesn’t want White to see the map, and so covers it up with 
his raincoat.  White trains his (portable) X-ray device on the raincoat 
and manages to look at the subway map.23 
Again, as seems clear, in training his X-ray device to look at the picture 
in Hugh’s wall-safe, Black infringes Hugh’s right to privacy; but in 
 21. Adapted from Thomson, supra note 1, at 117–18. 
 22. Adapted from Thomson, supra note 1, at 120. 
 23. Adapted from Thomson, supra note 1, at 122. 
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training his X-ray device to look at the subway map, White does not 
infringe Larry’s right to privacy. 
Now what, in these cases, accounts for the fact that there is (or is not) 
an infringement of the right to privacy?  One of Thomson’s insights is 
that answering this question will help us identify and distinguish the 
right to privacy. 
Consider the most popular nonreductionist theories and what they tell 
us about these cases.  Within the Hohfeld-Thomson theory of rights, 
“control-based” accounts of the right to privacy classify it as a liberty, 
that is, as a cluster-right that includes (i) a privilege as regards everyone 
of deciding (and carrying out the decision) to hide personal matters 
(whether in the form of one’s body or mind, one’s corporeal or mental 
acts, or facts about oneself) from others, and (ii) a claim against all 
others that they not interfere in certain sorts of ways with this decision 
and its implementation.  On this sort of view, the problem in The Quiet 
Fight is that Jones has infringed the married couple’s right to privacy by 
infringing their claim of noninterference—in the way of preventing them 
from carrying out their decision that others shall not access the sounds 
they emit during their conversation or acquire the information contained 
in those sounds.  Similarly, on this sort of view, the problem in The 
Pornographic Picture is that Black has infringed Hugh’s claim of 
noninterference with the implementation of his decision that others shall 
not look at, and thereby gain information about, the contents of his wall-
safe. 
By contrast, “accessibility-based” theories classify the right to privacy 
as no more than a claim against others that they not have the ability to 
experience (or obtain information about) such personal facts or states of 
affairs.  On such views, the problem in The Quiet Fight is that, because 
he can train an effective amplifying device on the married couple’s 
home, Jones has infringed their claim that others not have the ability to 
experience, and thereby gain information about, their conversation.  
Further, the problem in The Pornographic Picture is that, because he can 
train an effective X-ray device on Hugh’s wall-safe, Black has infringed 
Hugh’s claim that others not have the ability to experience, and thereby 
gain information about, the contents of his wall-safe. 
According to accessibility-based theories, it is possible to explain the 
fact that Smith does not infringe the married couple’s right to privacy in 
The Loud Fight by appealing to the concept of claim-waiving.  By 
raising their voices above a certain decibel level and omitting to close 




their windows, the married couple have voluntarily divested themselves 
of the claim that passersby not possess the ability to hear what they are 
saying to each other.  Control-based theories offer a somewhat different 
explanation for the fact that Smith does not infringe the married couple’s 
right to privacy.  They can say that, by stepping outside his house and 
watering his flowers, Smith interferes neither with the married couple’s 
decisions nor with the implementation of those decisions.  Given that Smith 
does not infringe the married couple’s claim of decisional noninterference, 
and given that privileges are not the sorts of rights that can be infringed, 
it follows that Smith infringes no right that is part of the cluster-right 
that is the married couple’s right to privacy. 
Control- and accessibility-based theories treat The Subway Map in yet 
another way.  The issue here concerns the zone over which the relevant 
agents have the right of control.  According to both sorts of theories, the 
right to privacy covers access to, or decisional control over, a zone that 
includes personal or intimate matters, but not items in the public domain.  
The fact that White does not infringe Larry’s right to privacy in The 
Subway Map is to be explained, not by adverting to Larry’s waiving of a 
claim or to the fact that White’s X-ray device does not interfere with 
Larry’s decision to keep others from looking at the map, but rather by 
adverting to the fact that the map does not fall within Larry’s zone of 
privacy. 
According to a somewhat different, but influential, “information-
based” view defended by Parent, the right to privacy is the claim that others 
not possess undocumented personal information about the claimholder.24  
Parent understands personal information to consist of “facts which most 
persons in a given society choose not to reveal about themselves (except 
to close friends, family . . . ) or of facts about which a particular individual 
is acutely sensitive and which he therefore does not choose to reveal 
about himself . . . .”25  He defines documented information as “information 
belonging to the public record.”26  Thus, for Parent, Jones infringes the 
married couple’s right to privacy in The Quiet Fight because, thanks to 
his amplifier, he now possesses information about the couple that does 
not belong to the public record and that they have chosen not to reveal to 
anyone.  And Black infringes Hugh’s right to privacy in The Pornographic 
Picture inasmuch as, thanks to his X-ray device, he now possesses 
undocumented personal information about Hugh (concerning Hugh’s 
 24. See generally Parent, Privacy, supra note 7, at 269; Parent, Recent Work, supra 
note 7, at 346. 
 25. Parent, Privacy, supra note 7, at 270. 
 26. Id.  This would include information “in court proceedings, newspapers, or 
other documents available for public inspection.”  Parent, Recent Work, supra note 7, at 
347. 
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possessions and viewing habits).  By contrast, since the contents of the 
married couple’s conversation are “available for public inspection” in 
The Loud Fight, Smith does not infringe the couple’s right to privacy 
when he acquires personal information about the couple as a result of 
walking outside to water his flowers.  And since the information contained 
in the subway map is part of the public record, White does not infringe 
Larry’s right to privacy in the course of using his X-ray device to look at 
the map through Larry’s raincoat. 
Thomson, following the lead of Davis, defends a reductionist account 
of the right to privacy.27  She begins by distinguishing, nonexhaustively, 
between two kinds of rights from which the right to privacy derives and 
to which it may be reduced: property rights and rights over the person.  
Property rights in respect of X are cluster-rights that include both 
positive rights (or privileges), such as “the right to sell [X] to whomever 
you like, the right to give [X] away, the right to tear [X], the right to look 
at [X],” and negative rights (or claims), such as “the right that others 
shall not sell [X] or give [X] away or tear [X].”28  Rights over the person 
include such “un-grand” rights as the claim that others shall not stroke 
one’s knee, the claim that others shall not cut off one’s hair while one is 
asleep, and the claim that others shall not paint one’s elbows green.29 
Thomson hypothesizes that one’s property right with respect to X 
includes not only the privilege of hiding X from others and the claim that 
others not interfere with one’s hiding X from others, but also the claim 
that others not look at, listen to, or otherwise experience X.  It is, she 
contends, the fact that Black manages to look at the contents of Hugh’s 
wall-safe in The Pornographic Picture that explains why Black infringes 
Hugh’s right to privacy; for Hugh’s right includes the claim against 
Black that Black not look at Hugh’s picture.  By contrast, the fact that 
White does not infringe Larry’s right to privacy in The Subway Map is to 
be explained by the fact that Larry does not have a claim that White not 
look at the map, a fact itself explained by the fact that Larry does not 
own the map—a piece of public or government property. 
Thomson also hypothesizes that one’s right over the person includes 
among its un-grand claims the claim that others not look at one’s body 
(or its parts) and the claim that others not listen to the sounds emitted by 
 27. For more on Davis’s theories, see generally Davis, supra note 1. 
 28. Thomson, supra note 1, at 120–21. 
 29. Id. at 126. 




one’s body (or its parts).  It is, she argues, the fact that Jones actually 
listens in on the married couple’s animated conversation in The Quiet 
Fight that explains why Jones infringes the couple’s right to privacy; for 
the couple’s right includes the claim against Jones that Jones not listen to 
the sound of their voices.  By contrast, the fact that Smith does not infringe 
the married couple’s right to privacy in The Loud Fight is to be explained 
by the fact that, by raising their voices and not closing their doors, the 
couple waived their claim that Smith not listen to them. 
Thomson then defends a “simplifying hypothesis” according to which 
“the right to privacy is itself a cluster of rights, . . . [that] intersects with 
the cluster of rights which the right over the person consists in and also 
with the cluster of rights which owning property consists in.”30  On her 
view, there is no autonomous right to privacy distinct from other rights.  
Thus, in The Pornographic Picture, it is not because Black infringes 
Hugh’s right to privacy that Black infringes Hugh’s property claim that 
Black not look at Hugh’s picture; rather, it is because Black infringes 
Hugh’s property claim that he infringes Hugh’s right to privacy.  
Similarly, in The Quiet Fight, it is not because Jones infringes the married 
couple’s right to privacy that Jones infringes the couple’s claim that he 
not listen to them; rather, it is because Jones infringes the couple’s claim 
that he not listen to them that he infringes their right to privacy.31 
IV.  COUNTEREXAMPLES TO THE STANDARD ACCOUNTS 
Standard nonreductionist accounts of the right to privacy enjoy a 
measure of success with regard to the task of explaining why there is (or 
is not) an infringement of the right in some central paradigm cases.  
However, there are other paradigm cases that point up significant weaknesses 
in the standard nonreductionist theories. 
Parent, following Thomson, points out (in my view, rightly) that 
control-based theories of the right to privacy stumble over what he calls 
“the threatened loss counterexample.”  Parent puts the point this way: 
The Threatened Loss Counterexample 
Suppose A invents a fantastic X-ray device that enables him to look right 
through walls.  A then focuses the device on my home but refuses to use it.  
Since he certainly has the power to find out everything that I am doing in my 
home it cannot be said that I any longer enjoy control over personal information 
about myself vis-à-vis A—at least I don’t in regard to activities done at [my] 
 30. Id. at 126–27. 
 31. Id. at 132–33. 
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home.  Still A has not invaded my privacy.  He doesn’t do that until he actually 
looks through his device.32 
The Threatened Loss Counterexample stresses the fact that the mere 
existence of an effective X-ray device in the hands of someone else is 
sufficient to deprive me of the power to determine who shall (and who 
shall not) acquire personal information about me and who shall (and who 
shall not) experience personal facts about me.  By virtue of possessing such 
a powerful X-ray device, A interferes with the implementation of my 
decision that no one outside my house shall learn or experience what it is 
that I do behind closed doors.  Thus, A infringes a claim to decisional 
noninterference that control-based theories identify as one of the rights 
that combine to form the cluster-right that is the right to privacy.  
Control-based theories therefore predict that A infringes my right to 
privacy even when he does not look through his X-ray device and so 
neither experiences nor acquires information about what I do behind 
closed doors.  But this is a counterintuitive result: A does not infringe 
my right to privacy unless he actually sees me (or gains information 
about me) with the help of his X-ray device. 
As Parent (also, in my view, rightly) points out, the same counterexample 
works against accessibility-based theories as well.  According to these 
theories, the right to privacy is a claim against others that they not have 
the ability to experience (or obtain information about) personal facts 
or states of affairs involving the claimholder.  It is the possibility of 
accessing—not the actual accessing of—personal information by others 
that accessibility-based theorists find disturbing.  Consequently, on such 
views, it is again sufficient for infringement of my right to privacy that A 
possess the capacity, in the form of his X-ray device, to access personal 
information about me that I have chosen to keep from him.  Hence, 
accessibility-based theories also predict the independently counterintuitive 
 32. Parent, Recent Work, supra note 7, at 344.  In this, Parent is following Thomson, 
who writes: 
If my neighbor invents an X-ray device which enables him to look through 
walls, then I should imagine I thereby lose control over who can look at me: 
going home and closing the doors no longer suffices to prevent others from 
doing so.  But my right to privacy is not violated [or infringed] until my 
neighbor actually does train the device on the wall of my house.  It is the actual 
looking that violates [or at least infringes] it, not the acquisition of power to 
look. 
Thomson, supra note 1, at 125–26 n.1. 
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result that A infringes my right to privacy even as his powerful X-ray 
device remains idle. 
Not surprisingly, Parent’s own information-based account of the right 
to privacy is not vulnerable to The Threatened Loss Counterexample.  
For Parent, my right to privacy is not infringed in the case unless A 
actually possesses undocumented personal information about me.  Since A 
has not looked through his X-ray device, he possesses no such information, 
and hence has not infringed my right to privacy.  But Parent’s own theory is 
hardly immune to counterexample.  In fact, there are strong reasons to 
think that the possession of undocumented personal information about a 
person is neither necessary nor sufficient to constitute an infringement of 
her right to privacy. 
Here is a counterexample to the necessity claim, one that focuses on 
whether personal information must be undocumented in order for 
possession of it to count as an infringement of the right to privacy: 
The Ex-Nazi 
Goldberg trains his powerful X-ray device on Rudolf’s wall-safe 
and learns from reading the papers therein that Rudolf was once a 
member of the Nazi party.  As it happens, Goldberg could have 
learned the very same information about Rudolf by reading old 
issues of Der Völkischer Beobachter in the public library, but did 
not do so. 
In The Ex-Nazi, Goldberg clearly infringes Rudolf’s right to privacy 
despite the fact that he learns no information that is not already a part of 
the public record.  It follows that the possession of undocumented 
information about X is not necessary for infringing X’s right to privacy. 
A different counterexample brings out the fact that the possession of 
undocumented personal information about X is not sufficient for 
infringing X’s right to privacy: 
The Innocent Gossip 
Sally has trained her powerful X-ray device on Rudolf, and has 
learned a piece of undocumented personal information about him, 
namely, that he likes to solve Sudoku puzzles.  As it happens, James 
and Sally love to gossip and share information.  Sally tells James that 
Rudolf is addicted to Sudoku puzzles.  When James asks Sally how 
she knows this, she replies (falsely) that Rudolf admitted it to her. 
In The Innocent Gossip, it is clear that James now has undocumented 
personal information about Rudolf.  And yet, as is also clear, it is not the 
case that James has infringed (or is infringing) Rudolf’s right to privacy 
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by virtue of the fact that he now knows that Rudolf likes to solve Sudoku 
puzzles.  It follows that the possession of undocumented personal information 
about X is not sufficient for infringing X’s right to privacy. 
Given the problems faced by standard nonreductionist accounts of the 
right to privacy, it is well worth asking whether Thomson’s reductionist 
account of the right fares any better.  The answer, I believe, is no.  The 
central thesis of Thomson’s account is that persons have such rights as 
the claim to not be looked at or listened to and the claim that one’s 
property not be looked at or listened to.  Though this thesis promises to 
explain why Hugh’s and the married couple’s right to privacy is infringed in 
The Pornographic Picture and The Quiet Fight, and though it does so 
without succumbing to any of the counterexamples to standard 
nonreductionist theories, it is vulnerable to a different class of counterexamples.  
Consider the following case: 
The Pornographic Tornado 
A tornado demolishes Hugh’s mansion, picks up the wall-safe, and 
drops it onto the ground in such a way that the pornographic picture 
pops out and lands face up in the middle of the Walk of Fame on 
Hollywood Boulevard.  Thomas, a tourist who is searching for the 
Star of Igor Stravinsky, spots the picture and looks at it. 
It is clear that Thomas does not infringe Hugh’s right to privacy by 
looking at Hugh’s pornographic picture on Hollywood Boulevard.  The 
picture is on the ground, face up, in plain sight.  There is no one else 
around.  The picture seemingly materializes out of nowhere.  It seems as 
plain as plain can be that Thomas commits no wrong—not even pro 
tanto—in looking at the picture.  But if Hugh’s right to privacy includes 
the claim that others not look at his picture, then Thomas has indeed 
infringed that right.33  I conclude that Thomson’s reductionist theory 
delivers the wrong result in The Pornographic Tornado. 
And it is not just with respect to cases involving private property that 
Thomson’s theory fails: it also fails in cases involving what she thinks of 
as rights over the person.  Consider, for example, a variant on the case of 
The Quiet Fight: 
 33. Hugh certainly has neither waived nor forfeited the relevant claim. 




The Accidentally Amplified Quiet Fight 
Our married couple, X and Y, are having another quiet fight behind 
closed doors.  But this time an unanticipated gust of wind sweeps 
through the house, knocking down the front door, carrying and 
amplifying the couple’s voices so that Stuart, who is washing his 
car in his driveway across the street, hears at least some of what X 
and Y have been saying. 
Again, it is clear that Stuart does not infringe the married couple’s right 
to privacy by hearing and listening to part of their conversation.  But if 
the couple’s right to privacy includes the claim that others not listen to 
them, then Stuart has indeed infringed that right.34  So Thomson’s theory 
delivers the wrong result in The Accidentally Amplified Quiet Fight as 
well. 
V.  THE BARRIER THEORY 
What do The Quiet Fight and The Pornographic Picture have in common 
that distinguishes them both from The Accidentally Amplified Quiet 
Fight and The Pornographic Tornado?  Ironically enough, Thomson herself 
provides us with a valuable clue.  She explains the point that “[w]here 
our rights in this area do lie is, I think, here: [(i)] we have a right that 
certain steps shall not be taken to find out facts, and [(ii)] we have a right 
that certain uses shall not be made of facts.”35  Leaving aside part (ii) of 
this statement (a part to which I shall return), Thomson’s point in part (i) 
is that the right to privacy is a claim against others that they not use 
certain sorts of means to experience or discover personal facts about the 
claimholder.  I propose to turn this insight into a more precise nonreductionist 
account of the right to privacy, one that promises to avoid all the 
problematic counterexamples discussed thus far. 
Let us go back to Thomson’s initial examples.  In The Quiet Fight the 
married couple have retreated behind the walls, closed windows, and 
closed doors of their house to have a private conversation.  The walls, as 
well as the closed windows and doors, represent a barrier or obstacle in 
the way of those (such as passersby) who might otherwise be in a 
position to hear what X and Y are saying to each other.  By training his 
amplifier on the couple’s house, Jones learns or experiences personal 
facts about them by virtue of the fact that he has breached this barrier.  
In The Pornographic Picture, Hugh has placed the picture in his wall-
 34. The couple certainly have neither waived nor forfeited the relevant claim. 
 35. Thomson, supra note 1, at 128. 
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safe in order to keep others from seeing it.  The fact that the wall-safe is 
locked and cannot be opened by someone who is ignorant of the relevant 
combination represents a barrier or obstacle in the way of those (such as 
friends, plumbers, and electricians) who might otherwise be in a position 
to look at the picture when Hugh has invited them into his house.  By 
training his X-ray machine on Hugh’s wall-safe, Black learns or experiences 
a personal fact about Hugh (namely, that Hugh has a pornographic 
picture in his safe) by virtue of the fact that he (Black) has breached this 
barrier.  Contrast both of these cases with The Loud Fight and The Subway 
Map.  In The Loud Fight, Smith breaches no barrier when the sound 
waves emitted by the couple reach his ears as he is watering the flowers 
in his front yard.  And in The Subway Map, although White does breach 
a barrier by using his X-ray device to look through Larry’s raincoat at 
the map, he does not thereby learn or experience any personal fact about 
Larry. 
This description of Thomson’s examples suggests the following 
nonreductionist hypothesis: 
The Barrier Theory 
For X to have a right to privacy against Y is for X to have a claim 
against Y that Y not learn or experience some personal fact about X 
by breaching a barrier used by X to keep others from learning or 
experiencing some personal fact about X. 
As should be clear, the Barrier Theory is immune to the counterexamples 
that bedevil the standard reductionist and nonreductionist theories.  For 
example, the Threatened Loss Counterexample poses no difficulty 
whatever for the Barrier Theorist.  The reason for this is that the mere 
existence of an effective X-ray device that is trained on my home does 
not constitute an infringement of the claim that the Barrier Theory takes 
to be definitive of my right to privacy.  In order to infringe this claim, A 
would actually have to use the device to see me through the walls of my 
house.  The Barrier Theory can also explain why Thomas does not infringe 
Hugh’s right to privacy in The Pornographic Tornado and why Stuart 
does not infringe the married couple’s right to privacy in The Accidentally 
Amplified Quiet Fight.  For, in looking at Hugh’s pornographic picture 
on the Walk of Fame, Thomas breaches no barrier being used by Hugh 
to prevent others from experiencing the picture; and in hearing part of 
the married couple’s conversation, Stuart breaches no barrier that the 
couple are using to prevent others from experiencing their altercation. 




There are various questions that might be pressed on a proponent of 
the Barrier Theory.  One question is whether it is required that the barrier 
that must be breached as a condition of the infringement of someone’s 
right to privacy be solid.  Although the right-to-privacy infringement cases 
considered thus far involve the breaching of a solid barrier, it is easy to 
see that this is an irrelevant feature of the cases.  For consider the following 
case: 
The Man in the Bushes 
[X and Y, a married couple,] have to talk over some personal matters.  It is most 
convenient [for them] to meet in the park, and [they] do so, taking a bench far 
from the path since [they] don’t want to be overheard.  It strikes a man [say, 
Brown] to want to know what [they] are saying to each other in that heated 
fashion, so he creeps around in the bushes behind [them] and crouches back of 
the bench to listen.36 
As seems clear, by creeping through the bushes and finding his way to a 
position ideally suited to the purpose of eavesdropping on their conversation, 
Brown infringes the couple’s right to privacy.  Yet the relevant barrier in 
The Man in the Bushes is not solid; it is the air occupying the distance 
between the bench and the path.  This air represents a sound barrier through 
which the sounds emitted by the couple cannot travel.  In general, there 
seems no limit to the variety of kinds of barriers that can be relied on by 
those who seek to use them to protect their privacy.  Such barriers include, 
among many others, wall-safes, window blinds, nontransparent clothing, 
desk drawers, masking agents (say, to cover the smell of alcohol or tobacco), 
air (as a sound barrier), and the encryption of email messages. 
Another question is whether the barrier that must be breached as a 
condition of the infringement of someone’s right to privacy must have 
been erected by, in addition to being used by, the relevant rightholder.  
The answer, I take it, is no.  For consider the following case: 
My Wall 
Michael does not want Mary to see him.  So he hides behind my wall.  
Mary trains her X-ray machine on my wall and thereby discovers 
Michael hiding behind it. 
I take it that in My Wall Mary infringes Michael’s right to privacy, even 
though Michael himself did not erect the barrier he is using to hide from 
her. 
A further question is whether Y’s breaching of a barrier being used by 
X to keep others from experiencing or learning personal facts about X 
 36. Id. at 120. 
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cannot count as an infringement of X’s right to privacy unless X’s use of 
the barrier is itself morally permissible.  The answer, I take it, is no.  For 
consider the following case: 
The Towel Snatcher 
Michael doesn’t want Mary to see him in his new bathing suit.  
But there is no ready means to hide from Mary, so Michael 
impermissibly snatches Jeff’s towel without Jeff’s permission and 
hides behind it.  Mary trains her X-ray machine on Jeff’s towel and 
discovers Michael hiding behind it in his new bathing suit. 
I take it that, in The Towel Snatcher, Mary yet again infringes Michael’s 
right to privacy (this time by looking through Jeff’s towel), even though 
Michael’s use of the towel without Jeff’s permission is morally 
impermissible.37 
A further question is whether the mere breaching of the relevant kind 
of barrier—a breaching that does not in fact result in the experiencing or 
discovery of any personal facts—is sufficient on its own to count as an 
infringement of the right to privacy.  The answer, I believe, is that it is 
not.  For consider the following variant on The Man in the Bushes: 
 37. Alan Rubel questions whether Y’s infringement of X’s right to privacy requires 
that X actually use the relevant barrier to keep others from learning or experiencing some 
personal fact about X.  Rubel proposes the following interesting case (call it The Point of 
Having Walls): 
[Suppose B does not] use the walls of [his] house as a barrier to protect information.  
[Perhaps B thinks] of them as a way to keep out the cold, displaying pictures, 
and holding up the roof.  Nonetheless, when A trains his X-ray device on [B’s] 
wall and learns some personal fact about [B], it would surely be the case that A 
has violated [B’s] right to privacy. 
Alan Rubel, Some Questions for the Barrier Theory, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 801, 806 
(2007).  My reaction to this is that, as stated, The Point of Having Walls is underdescribed.  
For let us suppose that B spends months looking in vain for a glass house, and that B is 
unable to raise enough money to build a glass house of his own.  B then reluctantly buys 
a house with nontransparent walls.  When the case is described in this way, my intuition 
is that A does not infringe B’s right to privacy when A acquires personal facts about B by 
training an X-ray device on the walls of B’s house.  It is only by illegitimately assimilating 
this sort of case to the typical case (namely, one in which the relevant homeowner does 
rely on the walls of his house to prevent others from acquiring personal facts about him) 
that The Point of Having Walls could reasonably be thought to serve as a counterexample 
to the Barrier Theory. 




The Loud Woodpecker 
The story is just as in The Man in the Bushes.  The married couple 
have repaired to an out-of-the-way park bench, and Brown has 
hidden in the bushes behind the bench to listen in.  Unfortunately, 
just as the couple start to converse, a woodpecker begins to peck 
loudly at a tree very close to Brown’s ears, and the sound of the 
pecking drowns out the couple’s conversation. 
In The Loud Woodpecker, Brown has clearly breached the sound barrier 
on which the married couple are relying as a means to keep their 
conversation from being overheard.  Yet Brown has not infringed the 
couple’s right to privacy because the woodpecker’s loud pecking has 
prevented him from experiencing (or learning anything about) the 
couple’s conversation.  So Brown’s breaching of the relevant sound barrier 
is not sufficient on its own to count as an infringement of the couple’s 
right to privacy.38 
Some theorists have proposed cases resembling The Loud Woodpecker 
to establish the opposite result.  Julie Inness proposes this case: 
The Stranger on the Bus 
[I]f I were seated on a bus, indulging in an innocent (though quiet) conversation 
with a friend, and a stranger on the bus suddenly stuck her head between our 
heads in a blatant attempt to hear the conversation, my privacy would be 
violated even if the stranger heard nothing because of the abrupt cessation of the 
conversation due to the intrusion.39 
Inness’s point in The Stranger on the Bus is that the stranger has, at the 
very least, infringed her and her friend’s right to privacy by attempting 
to eavesdrop on the conversation, even if unsuccessfully.  It may 
 38. Yet another question is whether a barrier breach that results in the extraction 
and acquisition, but not in the actual experiencing, of personal facts is sufficient on its 
own to count as an infringement of the right to privacy.  To my mind, this is a borderline 
case.  To fix ideas, consider a variant of The Loud Woodpecker (call it The Tape 
Recorder) in which Brown (i) manages to record the couple’s conversation on a portable 
tape recorder that he has slipped under the bench on which they are sitting, (ii) escapes 
with the tape of the conversation, but (iii) never listens to the tape.  Has Brown infringed 
the couple’s right to privacy in The Tape Recorder?  The answer is, at the very least, 
unobvious.  My own reaction is to say that, even though Brown extracts and acquires the 
relevant personal information by breaching a barrier on which the couple are relying to 
prevent others from experiencing their conversation, he does not actually infringe the 
couple’s right to privacy unless he actually listens to the tape.  But I see room for 
reasonable disagreement here.  It may also be that our considered intuitions are simply 
not fine-grained enough to distinguish between cases that, for compelling theoretical 
reasons, ought to be distinguished.  In any event, this sort of case merits further 
discussion.  Thanks to Alan Rubel for bringing this case to my attention. 
 39. INNESS, supra note 5, at 34. 
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therefore seem as if the infringement of the right to privacy does not 
require the actual acquisition of information or experience of a personal 
nature.  But, on reflection, The Stranger on the Bus establishes no such 
thing.  As I see it, the stranger has indeed infringed one of Inness’s rights; 
but the right she has infringed is not the right to privacy, but the claim to 
personal space.  If I bring my face inches from yours (without your 
permission), I have impermissibly “invaded your space.”  The best way 
to account for this is to suppose that you have a claim that I keep my 
body at a reasonable distance from yours.  This sort of claim is theoretically 
distinct from the right to privacy.  The moral here is that we should be 
careful not to interpret every sort of wrong to a person that involves 
bringing one’s body in close proximity to hers as an infringement of her 
right to privacy.40 
However, Inness also offers us a case that does not suffer from this 
sort of problem: 
The Stranger on the Train 
[I]f I were on a train with closed compartments, and I noticed 
someone sneaking up to take a look at me, my privacy would be 
violated even if I managed to hide under the bed before the person 
actually saw me.41 
Inness’s point is that the stranger infringes her right to privacy even 
though he does not see her, and even though he does not bring his body 
in close proximity to hers.  Although I agree, I deny that the case establishes 
that the experiencing or learning of personal facts is not a necessary 
condition of every infringement of the right to privacy.  For I take it that 
when the stranger nears the relevant train compartment, he is able to see 
into it—perhaps by looking through the blinds—even if he does not spy 
Inness herself.  And when he sees into Inness’s compartment, he experiences 
 40. It is also worth noting that there is something morally wrong about the 
eavesdropping attempts in The Loud Woodpecker and in The Stranger on the Bus, even if 
neither constitutes an infringement of a right.  It is no more permissible to unsuccessfully 
attempt to violate a right than it is to succeed in violating it.  Just as it would be wrong 
for A to attempt to kill an innocent person even if A’s attempt is unsuccessful, so it is 
wrong for Brown to attempt to listen in on the couple’s conversation in The Loud 
Woodpecker even if his attempt is unsuccessful, and so it is wrong for the stranger to 
attempt to listen in on the relevant conversation in The Stranger on the Bus.  The moral 
here is that the fact that a wrong has been committed does not entail that a right has been 
violated. 
 41. INNESS, supra note 5, at 34. 




her compartment and acquires information about it.  The stranger therefore 
learns certain personal facts about Inness, and this is sufficient for his 
breaching of the relevant barrier—in this case, the blinds—to count as an 
infringement of Inness’s right to privacy.  The moral here is that a 
person need not actually experience—or acquire information about—
one’s body in order to infringe one’s right to privacy. 
Some argue that the acquisition of personal information or experience 
that is not also intimate does not rise to the level of an infringement of 
the right to privacy.  For example, Inness claims that “if a friend examines 
my pen sitting on my desk, she usually does not violate my privacy . . . , but 
if she examines my open diary on the desk, a privacy violation occurs.”42  
Similarly, argues Inness, 
if my friend came to the door of my house and, in pausing to think for a moment 
before ringing the doorbell, heard me say “the,” I would not have grounds on 
which to claim a privacy violation.  But if that same friend stood in front of my 
door for hours, straining to hear my quiet conversation inside, my privacy 
would be violated (assuming I had not given her permission to listen).43 
Now, as I see it, both pairs of cases are tricky, in part because they are 
underdescribed.  Consider the first pair involving the pen and the diary.  
Suppose that I have invited my friend Lauren in to discuss some 
personal matters and that we are now talking in my study.  The phone 
rings and I leave the room to answer it, inviting Lauren to look around 
and make herself comfortable.  Under these circumstances, if she walks 
around my desk and examines either my pen or my open diary, she does 
not infringe my right to privacy.  For I have waived this right by inviting 
her to look around the room.  Now suppose that there is a thick velvet 
curtain separating the seating area in my study, where Lauren and I are 
now located, from the desk area.  It is plain to Lauren that the purpose of 
the curtain is to guard my privacy.  The phone rings and I leave the 
room, inviting Lauren to look around and make herself comfortable.  
This time, however, Lauren pushes the thick velvet curtain aside, walks 
around my desk, and examines both my pen and my open diary.  Under 
these circumstances, it appears that Lauren infringes my right to privacy 
in respect of the pen as well as in respect of the diary.  But my right to 
privacy in respect of the pen (assuming that it is an ordinary pen with no 
special properties) is so lacking in stringency as to be virtually trivial, at 
least by comparison to my right to privacy in respect of the diary.  For, 
by the Aggravation Principle, a claim’s stringency varies with how bad 
 42. Id. at 33–34. 
 43. Id. at 34–35. 
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its infringement would be for the claim holder.44  And here, we may 
assume, it would be far worse for me to have Lauren become familiar 
with the contents of my diary than it would be for her to become familiar 
with the appearance, construction, or function of my perfectly ordinary 
pen. 
Consider now the second pair involving “the” and longer stretches of 
intimate conversation.  Suppose, to fill the case in a bit, that my friend 
(say, Caroline), while at the door of my house and having paused 
momentarily to gather her thoughts before ringing the doorbell, happens 
to hear something far more intimate than “the.”  Suppose she hears me 
say that I am impotent.  Has Caroline infringed my right to privacy?  I 
think not.  I am aware that people (such as mail carriers, candidates for 
public office, and many salespeople) often, and quite permissibly, 
come to the door of my house and sometimes pause on the doorstep to 
gather their thoughts (their mailbags, their campaign fliers, or their 
solicitations) before ringing the bell.  I am also aware of the fact that, if I 
am speaking to someone in normal tones in the living room, even the 
least curious visitor on my doorstep can hear what I say without effort.  
Under these conditions, I have waived my right to privacy in respect of 
my living room conversations.  Thus, whether Caroline hears me say 
“the” or “I am impotent” matters not in the slightest: the fact that 
Caroline does not infringe my right to privacy derives not from the fact 
that the information she acquires while on my doorstep is lacking in 
intimacy, but rather from the fact that I have waived my right to privacy 
in respect of conversations conducted within easy earshot of visitors on 
my doorstep. 
However, to fill in the case a bit differently, suppose that Caroline 
presses her ear, or worse, an amplifying device, to the front door of my 
house, and hears me say “the.”  Under these conditions, it seems clear 
that Caroline does indeed infringe my right to privacy, even if by doing 
so she acquires no intimate information whatsoever.  The reason why 
Caroline’s behavior gives the appearance of falling below the infringement 
threshold is that it leads to the acquisition of completely inconsequential 
information.  As in the second case of Lauren and the pen, though 
Caroline infringes my right to privacy, the right she infringes is so 
lacking in stringency as to be virtually trivial.  So when the cases of 
 44. For a description of the Aggravation Principle, see supra notes 18–19 and 
accompanying text. 




Lauren and Caroline are filled in, we see that they do not establish that 
information acquired by breaching the relevant sort of barrier must be 
intimate if the breach is to count as an infringement of the right to 
privacy.45 
With these various questions and worries about the Barrier Theory out 
of the way, we may now return to the second part of Thomson’s interestingly 
suggestive statement about the nature of the right to privacy.  Thomson’s 
claim is that “we have a right that certain uses shall not be made of 
facts.”46  The “uses” Thomson has in mind here, as she later makes plain, 
concern not the acquisition of experience or information of a personal 
nature, but rather its dissemination.  Which brings up the following question: 
Under what sorts of circumstances, if any, does the dissemination of 
personal information to others constitute an infringement of the right to 
privacy? 
Thomson herself provides an interesting (if ultimately, as I will argue, 
unsuccessful) answer to this question.  She considers two sorts of cases.  
Here is the first case: 
 45. As a potential counterexample to the Barrier Theory, Alan Rubel proposes this 
sort of case (call it The Shadow): 
Suppose that A takes an interest in B.  A follows B around as B goes about his 
daily routine, and gathers data all the while.  A notes the things B buys, the books B 
checks out from the library.  He casually eavesdrops on B’s conversations, 
retrieves a bit of B’s hair from the barbershop floor and runs a quick DNA test.  
He does the same to B’s spouse and children to check parentage.  He conjures 
pretexts to interview B’s friends, coworkers, and family to find out as many 
details about B as he possibly can.  Through A’s efforts he learns a great deal 
about B’s life: his proclivities, his intellectual commitments, his political 
views, details about his relationships, and so forth. 
Rubel, supra note 37, at 804.  Rubel claims that the Barrier Theory wrongly predicts that 
A does not infringe B’s right to privacy in The Shadow.  In reply, I would urge that this 
prediction is not mistaken.  Crucial to the evaluation of The Shadow is the fact that the 
activities of B on the basis of which A gathers information about B are carried out in 
public, and intentionally so.  As I see the case, by conversing in public, purchasing items 
in public, walking down a public street, and so on, B waives his right of privacy in 
respect of the information that others might gather by watching his public behavior.  
Furthermore, by voluntarily throwing out his hair, B has also waived his right to privacy 
in respect of information that might be extracted from the hair, including color, consistency, 
smell, cellular structure, and DNA.  In addition, by voluntarily sharing information about 
B with A in conversation, B’s friends have waived their right to privacy in respect of that 
information.  So I see no reason to suppose that A infringes B’s right to privacy in The 
Shadow.  In fact, the information-gathering activities in which A engages in the case are 
typical of the information-gathering activities that are now used (I take it, permissibly) 
by private detectives all over the world. 
 46. Thomson, supra note 1, at 128. 
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The Picture in the News 
[Matt] find[s] out by entirely legitimate means (e.g. from a third party who 
breaks no confidence in telling [him]) that [Professor Jones] keep[s] a 
pornographic picture in [his] wall-safe; . . . though [he] know[s] it will cause 
[Professor Jones] distress, [Matt] print[s] the information in a box on the front 
page of [his] newspaper, thinking it newsworthy: Professor Jones of State U. 
Keeps Pornographic Picture in Wall-Safe!47 
Thomson argues that it is reasonable to suppose, in accordance with her 
“simplifying hypothesis,” that Professor Jones has “the right to not be 
caused distress by the publication of personal information, which is one 
of the rights which the right to privacy consists in . . . .”48  It follows 
from this hypothesis that, in The Picture in the News, Matt infringes 
Professor Jones’s right to privacy by disseminating legitimately acquired 
personal information about Jones.49 
Here is the second sort of case: 
The Inveterate Gossip 
Sally gives George information on the condition that he shall not 
spread it.  However, George spreads the information about Sally 
anyway.50 
Commenting on The Inveterate Gossip, Thomson writes that, in spreading 
the information about Sally, George violates her “right to confidentiality, 
whether the information is personal or impersonal.”51  However, she writes, 
“If the information is personal, I suppose [George] also violate[s] 
[Sally’s] right to privacy—by virtue of violating a right (the right to 
confidentiality in respect of personal information) which is . . . one of the 
rights which the right to privacy consists in . . . .”52 
 47. Id. at 129–30. 
 48. Id. at 130. 
 49. Thomson claims that Professor Jones’s right that Matt not print the information 
about the contents of Jones’s wall-safe is overridden by “a more stringent right, namely 
the public’s right to a press which prints any and all information, personal or impersonal, 
which it deems newsworthy . . . .”  Id.  It follows, on Thomson’s analysis, that Matt’s 
infringement of Professor Jones’s right to privacy does not also count as a violation of 
this right. 
 50. Adapted from Thomson, supra note 1, at 129. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 




Suggestive as these cases are, I do not believe that they need be 
analyzed as involving any infringement or violation of the right to 
privacy.  Consider The Picture in the News.  It is true that Professor Jones 
has “the right to not be caused distress by the publication of personal 
information,”53 but I see no reason to suppose that this right is itself a 
component of Jones’s right to privacy.  Every moral fact about the case 
that requires explanation can be explained on the hypothesis that Matt 
infringes Professor Jones’s right to not be caused distress.  As Thomson 
herself points out: “Distress, after all, is the heart of the wrong (if there 
is a wrong in such a case): a man who positively wants personal information 
about himself printed in newspapers, and therefore makes plain he wants 
it printed, is plainly not wronged when newspapers cater to his want.”54  
Now consider The Inveterate Gossip.  It is true that Sally possesses the 
right to confidentiality in respect of personal information, but again I see 
no reason to suppose that this right is itself a component of Sally’s right 
to privacy.  Every moral fact about the case that requires explanation can 
be explained on the hypothesis that George infringes Sally’s right to 
confidentiality.  He has broken his promise, and may therefore be 
responsible for any harm that comes to Sally as a result.  That is all. 
Now I do not think I can prove that Thomson’s analysis of these cases 
is mistaken.  The proper classification of wrongs is, to some extent, a 
matter of theoretical choice.  However, I see Thomson’s own classification 
as insufficiently motivated, especially in light of the possibility of accounting 
for acquisition cases (as opposed to dissemination cases) by means of a 
nonreductionist theory that is on balance superior to Thomson’s reductionist 
account.  Thomson’s analysis of the two dissemination cases fits in well 
with her reductionist claim that the right to privacy is a cluster-right 
consisting of a wide variety of different sorts of rights, including property 
rights and rights over the person.  But if, as I have argued, her reductionist 
analysis of acquisition cases succumbs to counterexamples, then it makes 
more sense to use Occam’s razor and refuse to multiply rights beyond 
necessity.  If every moral fact about the dissemination cases can be explained 
without adverting to a right to privacy, then let us simplify our moral 
theory by hypothesizing that the right to privacy concerns the 
acquisition, but not the dissemination, of personal information. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
I have been arguing that antireductionists are correct to insist that the 
right to privacy plays an autonomous explanatory role in moral theory.  
 53. Id. at 130. 
 54. Id. 
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Sometimes the infringement of a person’s right to privacy is not also the 
infringement of a property right or right over the person, and provides 
the rock bottom explanation of certain kinds of wrongs.  But standard 
antireductionist accounts of the right to privacy succumb to counterexamples 
and miss what lies at the heart of the right.  The right to privacy is a 
claim, a claim that concerns not control over access to—or information 
about—oneself, not accessibility, not the acquisition or dissemination of 
undocumented personal information, but rather the experiencing or discovery 
of personal facts about the rightholder via the breaching of barriers used 
to keep others from experiencing or discovering these sorts of facts.  
This is the core of the Barrier Theory I have defended as an alternative 
to the standard accounts. 
I want now to briefly consider what impact, if any, the Barrier Theory 
might have on the classification of legal wrongs, especially under United 
States law.  I shall take it as a background assumption (unargued for 
here) that the law should protect persons from at least the more serious 
sorts of violations of the moral right to privacy precisely because they 
are violations of this moral right.  That is, the law should indeed recognize a 
legal right to privacy. 
There are two kinds of violations of the legal right to privacy: (i) 
violations committed by private persons, and (ii) violations committed 
by the government.55  Under current United States law, violations of the 
first sort fall under the law of torts.56  But, at least as currently understood, 
tort law in the area of privacy sweeps more broadly than it ought.  Under 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Sections 652B–E, there are four 
separate ways in which a person’s right to privacy may be invaded 
(violated): (i) by intentionally intruding, physically or otherwise, in a 
manner that would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, upon the 
solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns (type 
652B);57 (ii) by appropriating to one’s own use or benefit the name or 
likeness of another (type 652C);58 (iii) by giving publicity to a matter 
concerning the private life of another, where the matter would be highly 
offensive to a reasonable person and is not of legitimate concern to the 
public (type 652D);59 or (iv) by knowingly or recklessly giving publicity 
 55. See, e.g., 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 603 (1998). 
 56. Id. 
 57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977). 
 58. Id. § 652C. 
 59. Id. § 652D. 




to a matter concerning another that places the other before the public in a 
false light, where the false light would be highly offensive to a reasonable 
person (type 652E).60  As should be plain, it follows from the Barrier 
Theory that privacy torts of types 652C–E do not in fact involve 
infringements of the moral right to privacy, for they do not involve the 
breaching of any barrier to the experiencing or learning of any personal 
facts about the rightholder.  Torts of type 652C are best understood as 
violations of the right to property, while torts of types 652D–E are best 
understood as violations of the right to not be caused distress.  
Moreover, there are even “intrusion on seclusion” torts of type 652B that 
should not be thought of as infringements of the right to privacy.  For 
section 652B treats any highly offensive intentional intrusion on a person’s 
solitude or seclusion, whether or not it results in the experiencing or 
discovery of any personal fact about her, as a privacy tort.  And yet, as I 
argued above, there are cases, such as The Loud Woodpecker, in which a 
highly offensive barrier breach does not constitute an infringement of 
anyone’s right to privacy.61  I conclude that, viewed from the standpoint 
of moral theory, it is artificial and theoretically unmotivated to treat all 
four 652 sections under the rubric of privacy.  At best, the Barrier Theory 
only countenances certain versions of the first (intrusion-on-seclusion) 
kind of privacy tort as true infringements of the right to privacy. 
What of violations of the second sort, that is, wrongs committed by 
government agents acting in that capacity?  Here, too, privacy law sweeps 
far more broadly than it ought.  As should be clear, I agree with those who 
argue that the “constitutional” right to privacy that plays an important 
role in U.S. Supreme Court decisions in the areas of contraception, 
abortion, sex, child-rearing, and marriage is, in the Hohfeld-Thomson 
framework, a liberty distinct from the claim that is the right to privacy.62  
As I have argued, there is nothing to be gained, and much in the way of 
theoretical clarity to be lost, by thinking of the right to privacy as a right 
to make and carry out decisions with respect to activities of a private 
nature.  As I see it, the only constitutional provision that protects a person 
against the government’s violation of his right to privacy is the Fourth 
 60. Id. § 652E. 
 61. See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text.  It might be argued that privacy 
tort law simply does not consider rights-infringements that do not result in some sort of 
damage to the rightholder.  On this view, barrier breaches of the relevant sort would not 
count as intrusion-on-seclusion torts unless they resulted in the acquisition of damaging 
experience or information.  The principle that tort law does not range over inconsequential 
rights-infringements therefore forces the Barrier Theory and section 652B to range over 
the same sorts of wrongs.  But this sort of extensional equivalence is purely accidental, 
and does not follow directly from the definition of the intrusion-on-seclusion tort. 
 62. See, e.g., Parent, Privacy, supra note 7. 
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Amendment’s proscription of unreasonable searches.63  When government 
agents open my mail, break down my door, tap my telephone, or train 
thermal imaging equipment on my property, they implicate the Fourth 
Amendment by virtue of the fact that they are breaching barriers that I 
am using to prevent others from experiencing or discovering personal facts 
about me.  Yet even here the Fourth Amendment protects against more 
than just the violation of a person’s right to privacy, for the protection it 
offers against government intrusions does not depend on whether such 
intrusions yield experience or discovery of personal facts about the 
rightholder.  And, on the other side, there are government violations of a 
person’s right to privacy against which the Fourth Amendment offers 
little or no protection, inasmuch as the exclusionary rule (banning the 
introduction at trial of evidence acquired by means of an unreasonable 
search) does not apply to civil cases and cannot, even in criminal 
matters, deter the government from violating a person’s right to privacy 
if it does not plan to introduce the evidence acquired thereby in a 
criminal case. 
Privacy law is therefore best understood as having two basic components: 
(i) a subclass of “intrusion on seclusion” torts concerning a private 
person’s experiencing or discovering a personal fact about X by means 
of a (highly offensive) breach of a barrier used by X to prevent others 
from accessing personal facts, and (ii) a subclass of Fourth Amendment 
violations concerning the government’s experiencing or discovering a 
personal fact about X by means of a (not necessarily highly offensive) 
breach of the same sort of barrier.  If the idea is to provide theoretical 
unity across the moral and legal realms in the area of privacy, then both 











 63. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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